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Estimating matching games with transfers

Jeremy T. Fox
I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market. I apply the estimator to data on the car parts supplied by automotive suppliers to estimate the returns from different portfolios of parts to suppliers and automotive assemblers.
Year of publication:
March 2016
Authors: Fox, Jeremy T.
Publisher: London : Cemmap, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Department of Economics, UCL
Subject: Matching | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Automobilzulieferindustrie | Automotive supplier industry | Lieferantenbewertung | Supplier evaluation
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