Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

Georges Bordes; Gilbert Laffond; Michel Le Breton

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems. -- social choice ; strategyproofness ; voting

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Bordes, Georges ; Laffond, Gilbert ; Le Breton, Michel
Published in:	SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195, ZDB-ID 2536381-5. - Vol. 2.2011, 4, p. 469-483
Subject:	Politische Entscheidung \| Political decision \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Theorie \| Theory

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