Evidence for Strategic Language Use in Chinese-English Bilinguals

Bilinguals tend to make decisions differently in different language contexts, but little is known about language use in relation to deception. In a computerised coin-drawing game, we tested whether late Chinese-English bilinguals prefer to strategically lie in their foreign language when betting against a virtual opponent. In Study 1, participants announced bets in Chinese (native language) or English (foreign language) depending on whether or not they had drawn a coin. Results showed that bilinguals preferred using Chinese over English when being truthful. Participants also switched between languages more often after telling the truth than lying, and they switched more to Chinese after telling the truth. Overall, if language use in the truth condition is considered the baseline, these results can be construed as a tendency to lie more in English. In Study 2, we explored whether verbal feedback modulates language use and risk-taking in bilinguals using the same paradigm. Results showed that bilinguals selected Chinese over English after receiving positive feedback in Chinese, and were overall more likely to bet after receiving positive than negative feedback. They no longer chose Chinese over English when telling the truth, but as in Study 1, they tended to switch languages more after receiving negative than positive feedback. These results provide the first empirical evidence for strategic language use in bilinguals, which may have implications in situations where bilinguals can choose their language of expression