Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates

This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is found that if behaviour is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run equilibrium for the game. However, conditions for ergodicity become increasingly restrictive as population size increases

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Robles, Jack
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, 1998 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 1998 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198625