Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior

I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Possajennikov, Alex
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 21.2003, 4, p. 921-928
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Evolution \| Aggregate-taking \| Aggregative games

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370762