Ex Post Efficiency and Individual Rationality in Incentive Compatible Trading Mechanisms

This paper concerns the design of a trading mechanism for a group of traders when their valuations of the good are private information and they bargain over who shall consume more than his initial endowment and who shall consume less. It is shown that there generally exists a set of initial endowments of the traded commodity such that it is possible to design a trading mechanism which is incentive compatible, individually rational and ex post efficient.

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Year of publication:	1988
Authors:	Lundgren, Stefan
Publisher:	Stockholm : The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Subject:	Verhandlungen \| Theorie \| Efficient trading \| mechanism design.

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Series:	IUI Working Paper ; 202
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/94952 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0202 [RePEc]
Classification:	O24 - Trade Policy; Factor Movement Policy; Foreign Exchange Policy
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334922