Ex-Post Equilibrium in Frictional Markets

This paper studies competition among multiple sellers in frictional markets. Ex-post equilibrium is tractable in terms of market information revelation. Applying the sufficient condition for equilibrium robustness (with respect to a seller's deviation to any arbitrary selling mechanism) to ex-post equilibrium yields comparative statics on the distribution of trading prices and profits.

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Year of publication:	2014-04
Authors:	Han, Seungjin
Institutions:	Department of Economics, McMaster University
Subject:	ex-post equilibrium \| market frictions \| robust equilibrium \| comparative statics \| competing mechanism desgin

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	23 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886185