Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
Sandrine Ollier; Lionel Thomas
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ollier, Sandrine ; Thomas, Lionel |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 148.2013, 6, p. 2383-2403
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| Subject: | Ex post participation | Adverse selection | Moral hazard | Countervailing incentives | Pooling contracts | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257928