Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Kohli, Deepti |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 22.2022, 1, p. 153-198
|
Subject: | corruption | electoral competition | equilibrium policy | lobby formation | swing voters | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Korruption | Corruption | Wahl | Election |
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