Excessive entry in a bilateral oligopoly

In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of freeentry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always sociallyinsufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power. Weshow that this conclusion is very much dependent on the use of “efficient bargaining”model in their analysis. Using a “right-to-manage” model, we show that, even if theupstream agents have full bargaining power, entry is excessive in a bilateral oligopolyif the cost of entry is not very high...

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Year of publication:	2008-05-01
Authors:	Mukherjee, Arijit
Institutions:	University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Subject:	Oligopol \| Verhandlungsführung \| Erklärung \| statement

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Extent:	82944 bytes 15 p. application/pdf
Series:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion PaperNo. 08/02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; Strategic management ; Study of commerce ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)