Excessive Labour Raiding
Labour raiding refers to firms recruiting and hiring employed workers. The literature on labour raiding supports the idea that raiding sorts workers into their most productive positions. I present a model where an outside firm decides whether or not to pay to learn the match-quality of an employed worker and the employer decides whether or not to pay its worker a high wage that pre-empts the raiding. I show that the employer may pay a low wage and gamble that it will not be raided rather than use a pre-emptive wage. This leads to an excessive amount of raiding. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2007.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | McCANNON, BRYAN C. |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 75.2008, 297, p. 140-147
|
Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
freely available
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