Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments

Tobias Hiller

Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Hiller, Tobias
Published in:	Applied economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0003-6846, ZDB-ID 280176-0. - Vol. 48.2016, 4/6, p. 321-330
Subject:	Shapley value \| EC value \| voting power \| excluded coalitions \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Shapley-Wert \| Macht \| Power \| Regierungskoalition \| Coalition government \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Abstimmung \| Voting \| Parlament \| Parliament \| Interessenpolitik \| Lobbying

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