Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new up-stream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Kitamura, Hiroshi ; Matsushima, Noriaki ; Sato, Misato
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	Antitrust policy \| Entry deterrence \| Exclusive contracts \| Nash bargaining

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 978
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	867103531 [GVK] hdl:10419/148205 [Handle] RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0978 [RePEc]
Classification:	L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011564958