Executive compensation and the optimality of managerial entrenchment
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Gorton, Gary ; Grundy, Bruce D. |
Publisher: |
Philadelphia, PA |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Lohn | Wages | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 48, [7] S. : graph. Darst |
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Series: | Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research. - Philadelphia, Pa., ZDB-ID 2262187-8. - Vol. 96,15 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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