Expectations vs. fundamentals-driven bank runs : when should bailouts be permitted?
Year of publication: |
July 2016
|
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Authors: | Keister, Todd ; Narasiman, Vijay |
Published in: |
Review of economic dynamics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1094-2025, ZDB-ID 1406100-4. - Vol. 21.2016, p. 89-104
|
Subject: | Bank runs | Bailouts | Financial stability | Moral hazard | Macroprudential regulation | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Finanzmarktaufsicht | Financial supervision | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Bankenliquidität | Bank liquidity | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Bankinsolvenz | Bank failure |
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