Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. There is significant over-dissipation in both stages of the two-stage contest and experience diminishes over-dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject's utility. A simple behavioral model that accounts for a non-monetary utility of winning can explain significant over-dissipation in both contests. It can also explain why the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sheremeta, Roman M. |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 68.2010, 2, p. 731-747
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Rent-seeking Contest Contest design Experiments Risk aversion Over-dissipation |
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