Section A: Two-Person Interaction -- 1. Optimal Policies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 2. Experimental Studies of Interdependent Mixed-Motive Games -- 3. Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Complete Information -- 4. Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Incomplete Information -- 5. Decisions of Timing in Experimental Probabilistic Duels -- 6. Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargaining -- Section B: Small Group Interaction -- 7. A PDP-11/45 Program for Playing n-Person Characteristic Function Games -- 8. Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Games -- 9. Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five- Person Games -- 10. Standards of Fairness in 4-Person Monopolistic Cooperative Games -- 11. Coalition Formation in the Triad When Two are Weak and One is Strong -- 12. The Power of a Coalition and Payoff Disbursement in Three-Person Negotiable Conflicts -- 13. Coalition Formation in a Five-Person Market Game -- 14. Relative Gain Maximization in Sequential 3-Person Characteristic Function Games -- 15. Comparison of Theories for Payoff Disbursement of Coalition Values -- Section C: Large Group Interaction -- 16. Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset -- 17. Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesset -- Author Index.
