Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & business. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0148-6195, ZDB-ID 716757-X. - Vol. 67.2013, p. 4-23
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Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude |
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