Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions

I introduce a model of extensive form games with coalitional actions, which provides a formal framework for analysing situations in which coalitions of players may take joint actions sequentially. I present an equilibrium concept that generalizes subgame-perfect equilibrium, and is closely related to the core. The new theory provides insights into the theory of sequential economies.

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Year of publication:	1995-12
Authors:	Dagan, Nir
Institutions:	Nir Dagan
Subject:	extensive form games with coalitional actions \| backward induction \| recontracting equilibrium \| core \| subgame perfect equilibrium

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Extent:	text/html
Series:	Economic theory and game theory.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	10 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357961