Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans
Insider ownership and antitakeover provisions both affect a firm's vulnerability to takeover, its value, and its managers' incentives and utility. We examine the simultaneous determination of insider ownership and takeover protection using data from mutual savings and loan associations converting to stock form. At low levels of insider ownership, we find that ownership is negatively related to the number of extraordinary antitakeover provisions; at higher levels, ownership is not related to the number of antitakeover provisions. These results are consistent with insider entrenchment.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Boyle, Glenn W. ; Carter, Richard B. ; Stover, Roger D. |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 33.1998, 02, p. 291-304
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
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