Fair cake-cutting in practice
Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We nd that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their proportional counterparts, despite the fact that agents very often manipulate them. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy- free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also nd that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning reduces truth-telling behavior, but also reduces envy.
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Kyropoulou, Maria ; Ortega, Josué ; Segal-Halevi, Erel |
Publisher: |
Mannheim : Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |
Subject: | cake-cutting | Selfridge-Conway | cut-and-choose | envy | perceived fairness | preference manipulation | experimentation and learning |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | ZEW Discussion Papers ; 18-053 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1043594671 [GVK] hdl:10419/190568 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18053 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946257