Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies withSingle-peaked Preferences

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and variants of k-monotonicity,are sufficient for implementability in k- Fault Tolerant Nash equilibria (k-FTNE). Inaddition, these new conditions are stable by intersection which makes it possible to checkdirectly the k ffi FTNE implementability of the social choice correspondences. We applythese results to exchange economies with single -peaked preferences, to nite allocationproblems, and to equilibrium theory.[...]

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Year of publication:	2009-07-07
Authors:	Doghmi, Ahmed ; Ziad, Abderrahmane
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Eingeschränkte Rationalität \| Implementierung \| Präferenz \| preference \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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1 Introduction
2 Notations and definitions
3 New sufficient conditions for faulty Nashimplementation
4 Applications in exchange economies withSingle-peaked preferences
4.1 Stability and k-FTNE implementability of theintersection of fair division solutions
4.2 On no-monotonic solutions of the problem of fairdivision
5 Application to nite allocation problems
5.1 k-FTNE implementability of the Pareto correspondence
5.2 k-FTNE implementability of the core correspondence in coalitionalgames
6 Application to Equilibrium theory: theconstrainedWalrasian correspondence withslack
7 Conclusion
References

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022175