Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Andrew Postlewaite
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hurwicz, Leonid ; Maskin, Eric ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
| Published in: |
Social design : essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz. - Cham, Switzerland : Springer, ISBN 978-3-319-93808-0. - 2019, p. 99-137
|
| Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz im Buch ; Book section |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061463