Once again, the Federal Reserve is under attack from lawmakers who propose measures designed to increase the accountability of monetary policymakers while preserving the independence of the institution. Legislation that is currently the subject of debate on Capitol Hill would either remove the voting power of District Reserve Bank presidents or require that they be appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate. These efforts (well-intentioned or not) to improve the process of making monetary policy cannot possibly improve the substance of policy, because they do not address the central shortcoming of the present framework: the absence of a single, clear, measurable, and attainable objective for monetary policy. Instead, the political leadership focuses on a mix of objectives that no central bank can deliver. While providing a convenient scapegoat for politicians and protective cover for central bankers, the existence of multiple objectives that vary in importance over time precludes the intentional and lasting achievement of any objective. In particular, price stability and the benefits that accompany it are lost in the process. Price stability should be the dominant objective of monetary policy because it promotes an environment conducive to achieving the highest standard of living that our endowment of real resources and human capital will permit. Federal Reserve independence and accountability are essential to achieving this objective. Most politicians confuse the notions of independence and accountability, and by doing so blur the debate over central bank refor