Finite-state contract theory with a principal and a field of agents
René Carmona, Peiqi Wang
| Year of publication: |
2021
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Carmona, René ; Wang, Peiqi |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 67.2021, 8, p. 4725-4741
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| Subject: | principal agent problem | mean field game | epidemic control | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3760 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012625009