FIRMS, INCENTIVES, AND THE SUPPLY OF FOOD SAFETY: A FORMAL MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
Recent instances of significant food safety breeches in both meat and biotechnology challenge traditional safety efforts. A formal model utilizing agency theory is used to explore the power relationships between the regulator and the firm. Fundamental issues effecting firms' supply of safety are demonstrated and alternative corrective mechanisms are discussed.
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Goldsmith, Peter D. ; Turan, Nesve A. ; Gow, Hamish R. |
Institutions: | Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA |
Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety |
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