Fixed versus variable supply in the public provision of goods

Using discriminatory price auctions with variable supply, we explore a situation in which a corruptible public employee is in charge of producing and allocating a finite number of goods among consumers with uniformly distributed valuations. The negative effects of corruption are lower when the employee's task is to "provide at least q0 goods" than when the employee is required to "provide exactly q0 goods".

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Buia, Raluca Elena
Published in:	Research in Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 1090-9443. - Vol. 63.2009, 3, p. 160-164
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Corruption Bribing Discriminatory price auctions Variable supply

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565555