Fixed-Wages, Wage Differentials and Worker Heterogeneities

We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference for leisure and time preference rate are unobservable by the principal in a two-period model. We first reduce this three-dimensional problem to a standard one-dimensional screening problem. Features of second-best labour contracts provide a rationale for both fixed-wages and wage differentials

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Carlier, Guillaume ; Gaumont, Damien
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Lohnstruktur \| Wage structure \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212748