Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
Brett Graham; Dan Bernhardt
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Graham, Brett ; Bernhardt, Dan |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 93.2015, p. 59-88
|
| Subject: | Supermajority | Agenda setting | Legislative bargaining | Delegated decision making | Voting rules | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Gesetzgebung | Legislation | Politische Entscheidung | Political decision | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Entscheidung | Decision | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383968