Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games.
This paper provides experimental evidence on forward induction as a refinement criterion. In the basic extensive form, one of the two players chooses to play a battle-of-the-sexes game or to receive a certain payoff. According to forward induction, choosing to play the game is a signal about intended action. Though the presence of the outside option changes play, the authors find only limited support for the forward-induction hypothesis. The effects of the outside option also reflect the creation of a focal point through the asymmetry created by offering the outside option to one of the two players. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1993
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cooper, Russell ; DeJong, Douglas V. ; Forsythe, Robert ; Ross, Thomas W. |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 83.1993, 5, p. 1303-16
|
Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
Cooper, Russell, (1989)
-
Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Cooper, Russell, (1996)
-
Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Cooper, Russell, (1996)
- More ...