Forward-looking and incentive-compatible operational risk capital framework

Marco Migueis

Year of publication:	May 22, 2017
Authors:	Migueis, Marco
Publisher:	Washington, D.C. : Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board
Subject:	Banking Regulation \| Incentive Compatibility \| Operational Risk \| Regulatory Capital \| Operationelles Risiko \| Operational risk \| Basler Akkord \| Basel Accord \| Theorie \| Theory \| Bankrisiko \| Bank risk \| Bankenregulierung \| Bank regulation \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Risikomanagement \| Risk management

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