Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Caleb A. Cox and Brock Stoddard

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Cox, Caleb A. ; Stoddard, Brock
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 6.2015, 4, p. 394-412
Subject:	public goods \| experiment \| framing \| cooperation \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Experiment \| Prospect Theory \| Prospect theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kooperation \| Cooperation \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Soziales Verhalten \| Social behaviour