Friends and Foes at Work: Assigning Teams in a Social Network
Year of publication: |
2017
|
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Authors: | Daske, Thomas |
Publisher: |
München : Technische Universität München |
Subject: | staffing | social preferences | social network | delegation | control |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Preprint |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 101045319X [GVK] hdl:10419/172493 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:esprep:172493 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D85 - Network Formation ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction) |
Source: |
-
Friends and foes at work : assigning teams in a social network
Daske, Thomas, (2017)
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Efficient incentives in social networks : "gamification" and the coase theorem
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