From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions

A procedure to construct a social welfare function from a social choice function is suggested and it is shown that the dictatorial are the only unanimous social welfare functions that can be reconstructed from a social choice function that does not change the social choice when a defeated alternative is moved to the last position in all the individual preferences.

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Year of publication:	2002-07-19
Authors:	Quesada, Antonio
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2002, 16, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630163