Functional unpleasantness : the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Heller, William B. ; Sieberg, K. K. |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 135.2008, 3/4, p. 399-413
|
Subject: | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Altruismus | Altruism |
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