Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals
Year of publication: |
August 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Zhen |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 65.2016, p. 58-70
|
Subject: | Games with incomplete information | Partial signal-awareness | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | Analogy-based expectation equilibrium | Coarse reasoning | Bounded rationality | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Begrenzte Rationalität | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Signalling |
-
Learning foundation for the cursed equilibrium
Miettinen, Topi, (2008)
-
Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information
Kets, Willemien, (2013)
-
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types
Haimanko, Ori, (2023)
- More ...
-
Bounds for a class of stochastic recursive equations
Liu, Zhen, (1999)
-
Liu, Zhen, (2014)
-
Ren, Yunli, (2009)
- More ...