Genetic adverse selection: Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease
Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. This finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for HD to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the HD-risk population with and without the HD mutation.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Oster, Emily ; Shoulson, Ira ; Quaid, Kimberly ; Dorsey, E. Ray |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 94.2010, 11-12, p. 1041-1050
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Adverse selection Long-term care insurance Huntington disease Genetic testing |
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