Goal setting and monetary incentives : when large stakes are not enough
Year of publication: |
December 2015
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Authors: | Corgnet, Brice ; Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín ; Hernán González, Roberto |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 61.2015, 12, p. 2926-2944
|
Subject: | intrinsic motivation | incentives | goal setting | reference-dependent preferences | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Motivation | Motivationstheorie | Motivation theory | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel | Corporate objective | Experiment | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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