Going once, going twice, reported!

Jeroen Hinloopen; Sander Onderstal

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel deterrence, cartelstability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartelformation, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces theaverage winning bid. In contrast, while a leniency program has no additional effect on cartelformation or cartel recidivism, it makes cartels more stable and reduces the winning cartel bid.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Hinloopen, Jeroen ; Onderstal, Sander
Publisher:	Rotterdam [u.a.] : Tinbergen Inst.
Subject:	Antitrust policy \| Leniency Programs \| English Auction \| First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction \| Laboratory Experiments \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Experiment \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy \| Auktion \| Auction \| Straffreiheit \| Exemption from punishment \| Kartellrecht \| Antitrust law