Good News Only, Please : An (In-)Equivalence Result of Collusion under Hard and Soft Information

This note shows that the optimal collusion-proof contract under soft information is equivalent to that under hard information if and only if all the collusion-proof constraints are binding in the latter environment. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition is that the supervisor improves the principal's information by bringing a 'good' news. That is, the agent is more likely to be an efficient type. An application of the analysis shows that contingent (external) auditing should target a report of bad news

Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Chiou, Jing-Yuan
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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