Group contests with private information and the "Weakest Link"
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barbieri, Stefano ; Kovenock, Daniel J. ; Malueg, David A. ; Topolyan, Iryna |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 118.2019, p. 382-411
|
Subject: | All-pay auction | Bayes-Nash equilibrium | Coordination | Groups | Incomplete information | Weakest link | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Unvollkommene Information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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