Group versus individual performance pay in relational employment contracts when workers are envious
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Kragl, Jenny |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 1058-6407, ZDB-ID 1123863-X. - Vol. 24.2015, 1, p. 131-150
|
Subject: | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Neid | Envy | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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