Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Kirkegaard, René |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 64.2013, p. 98-110
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Subject: | All-pay auctions | Asymmetric auctions | Contests | Handicaps | Preferential treatment | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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