Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard. Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	SCHINDLER, DIRK ; SCHJELDERUP, GUTTORM
Published in:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 11.2009, 4, p. 599-621
Publisher:	Association for Public Economic Theory - APET

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005005037