Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams

Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González

Year of publication:	12-2019
Authors:	Corgnet, Brice ; Gunia, Brian ; Hernán González, Roberto
Publisher:	[Orange, CA] : Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
Subject:	Social Incentives \| Social Pressure \| Moral Hazard in Teams \| Laboratory Experiments \| Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Experiment \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Soziale Beziehungen \| Social relations \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Gruppenentscheidung \| Group decision-making \| Arbeitsleistung \| Job performance

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