This article attempts to develop a L&E analysis of how lawyers use knowledge to interpret new phenomena. This analysis adopts the analytical tools which can be identified in Guido Calabresi’s interdisciplinary approach to law. We will not discuss the content of Calabresi’s theories either on merit goods, the market and command distinction or the notion of preferences and values. Insightful articles included in this special issue already cover all these aspectsThis article simply pays a tribute to Calabresi’s courage to engage in interdisciplinary research without alienating economists or positivist lawyers; an attitude which he has preserved throughout his career. Indeed, since his first article in 1961 , Guido Calabresi, has been conducting legal analysis in a way that demonstrates his willingness to sacrifice technically accurate terms to facilitate participation in the discussion of societal changes that affect both the economy and the law. For instance, his “sloppy” usage of economic terms such as “costs” is justified by the attempt to communicate with lawyers and facilitate the use of economic knowledge within the legal profession. Loose use of economic terms does not mean “inaccurate” or “unsound”. Instead, Calabresi “translates” juridical thoughts to foster their integration with other knowledge and enable the study of complex phenomena. Overly strict utilization of economic theory would prevent dialogue with bordering disciplines, with the consequence that substantial insights would be lost. From his perspective, such an openness towards “the unanalyzed experience of the human race” as interpreted thorough other domains of knowledge, is the key difference between Law and economics and Economic analysis of Law. In these two approaches, theory plays, respectively, an ancillary rather than a prominent role in the epistemic process. Calabresi’s The Future of law and Economics plainly adheres to the former and concentrates on a specific portion of reality, i.e. “the world as lawyers see it” (Calabresi, 2016: ).With the same spirit, this article attempts to develop a L&E analysis of lawyers’ use of knowledge to justify their interpretations of the world, a mediated activity that represents the essence of law. Indeed, due to its rule-guided nature, legal reasoning requires that any epistemic proposition included in an opinion be justified. Of course, legal justification is a necessary but not sufficient reason for action, since it has to be complemented with an epistemic justification of how the empirical premises upon which the decision hinges have been understood.Hence, the aim of this article is twofold. First, this essay tries to share some thoughts about the role of “the world as it is” within L&E analysis, accompanied by some considerations about the institutional framework that is predominant in L&E studies. Scientific research is a social process and therefore it is characterized by the presence of institutions. Secondly, this article develops a brief analysis of judge’s use of knowledge and its effect on the stability of legal entitlements .The essay is divided in three sections. The first section addresses the tendency towards specialization within science, which, on the one hand, is essential to advance deep knowledge of specific aspects of reality, and on the other, might overlook its tacit and creative dimensions that are essential to study complex objects. The second section is devoted to the analysis of “how lawyers see the world”, drawing from theories in Comparative Law, European and American Scholarship in law and economics. In particular, the section discusses how Lawyers use the two main sources of authority in current societies, Law and Science (Jasanoff, 2003), and adjust them to each other through a process of learning and adoption that shapes lawyers’ use of knowledge. The third section sketches out a possible L&E analysis of the instability of lawyers’ use of knowledge. Such instability may not be evident and may have severe and unforeseen consequences in terms of judiciary’s capability of protecting legal rights. The term “legal bubble” will be used to describe this instability, insofar a bubble is defined as any collective expectation about future states of affairs based on ill-justified knowledge. While speculative bubbles typically concern asset prices, the “legal bubble” described here concerns lawyers’ use of knowledge. A practical example of such instability is provided in the third section, which discusses the case of internet Over The Top (OTT) operators and the US-EU conflict in data protection stances.This article represents an account of an ongoing exploration of the border between economics and law in search of new L&E objects. It is an experiment in “naming cum pointing” (Polanyi, 1966) and it is inspired by Calabresi’s intellectual courage