Hedging Executive Compensation Risk and the Investment Decision
Year of publication: |
[2022]
|
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Authors: | Elnahas, Ahmed ; Jain, Pawan |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Hedging | Führungskräfte | Managers | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (44 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 16, 2022 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.4085665 [DOI] |
Classification: | G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; g41 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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