Hertzian Dynamic Models In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Theory Of Logic

During the last century the social sciences grew from the stage of speculative system building to a more mature development in which empirical data are sought for the significance they can have for systematic theories. A lot of work in this field concerns itself with determining the methodological and conceptual prerequisites for a mature science of human reasoning and behavior. Modeling human reasoning and human behavior, although currently focused on social and economic phenomena like organizations, organizational knowledge, leadership, cooperation etc., are historically dependent upon modeling natural phenomena in physical science, precisely because physical science tackles successfully the issue of building upon empirical data. This paper pursues an apparently small, but nonetheless significant, historical claim concerning the “relative position of human reasoning and mechanics” a claim made possible by the development of late 19th century’s epistemology of science (mainly Heinrich Hertz’s) and theoretical philosophy (Ludwig Wittgenstein). The main idea of the paper is that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “logical representation”, seen as a landmark for what human reasoning is about, is an intricate analogue to the Hertzian “dynamic models” from the Principles of Mechanics. This analogy is analyzed and explained with regard to the problem of the “logic of color”.