Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games

In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Figuieres, Charles ; Rychen, Frédéric
Institutions:	Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)
Subject:	Â \| modélisation économiquethéorie des jeux \| modèle dynamique \| sciences économiques \| analyse mathématiqueéquilibre de nash

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economics Bulletin 426 pages long435
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010780154