Hidden Action Principal-Agent Problems with Endogenous Signal Precision

We study costly augmentation of signal accuracy by the principal in a binary model, with two-dimensional signal quality. Irrespective of cost, the outcomes when the principal can pre-commit to precision levels differ significantly from those when she cannot

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Year of publication:	[2009]
Authors:	Banerjee, Priyodorshi
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Signalling \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1, 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1273456 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720300